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ARGUMENT 
POINT I — THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN GAGON AND 
THE PRESENT ACTION HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH 
THE ISSUE IN THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL. 
Prudential attempts to distinguish Gagon v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah App. 
1987), on the basis that Gagon involved collision damage, whereas 
the present action does not. Such a distinction is of no 
significance, because the mechanical breakdown provision in the 
policy in Gagon was an exclusion from collision coverage, just as 
the mechanical breakdown provision in the policy which is the 
subject of this action is an exclusion, not only from the 
collision coverage but also from the so-called "comprehensive" 
coverage on which the plaintiff relies. This case is not 
concerned with the definition of "collision", but with the 
definition of "mechanical". 
Prudential also attempts to explain Gagon away by 
saying that the appeal in Gagon only involved the plaintiff's bad 
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faith claim. Prudential's argument overlooks the fact that if 
the damages in Gagon had been excludable under the mechanical 
breakdown clause, the bad faith issue could not have been reached 
because, in that event, denial of coverage would have been 
permissible. 
The differences between the present action and Gagon 
have nothing to do with the "mechanical breakdown" issue. The 
fact remains that in Gagon, the plaintiff was allowed to take his 
case to the jury for a determination of whether the breakdown was 
"mechanical", but in the present action the plaintiff was not. 
POINT II — PRUDENTIAL CONCEDES THE VALIDITY 
OF THE APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OP CONTRACT 
INTERPRETATION, WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN FOLLOWED 
BY THE DISTRICT COURT OR THE COURT OF 
APPEALS. 
Prudential does not dispute the correctness of any of 
the three principles of contract construction and proof relied 
upon by the plaintiff, but merely makes unsupported, and 
unsupportable, conclusory assertions that the principles have 
been followed. 
1. Construction of ambiguous provision against insurer. 
Prudential concedes that "if there is some ambiguity 
in the insurance policy, that ambiguity is construed against the 
insurer." (Prudential's Brief in Opposition, page 3.) The 
District Court admitted that the policy in this action was 
ambiguous, saying: 
The Court is persuaded, even though the 
language is somewhat confusing, [etc.l. 
(Tr. 3; Appendix III to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.) The 
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District Court's statement that the language is "confusing" is 
presently the law of this case. The confusion should have been 
resolved against the insurer, especially for purposes of the 
insurer's motion for summary judgment. Utah Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Orville Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308 (Utah 
1983); Christensen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 
443 P.2d 385 (1968)? P. E. Ashton Company v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 
162, 406 P.2d 306 (1965); Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine 
Insurance Company, 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608 (1963). 
2. Construction to give effect to all provisions of agreement. 
Prudential does not dispute the rule that "a contract 
is to be interpreted so as to give effect to the entire 
agreement, without ignoring or rendering meaningless any part 
thereof." (Prudential's Brief in Opposition, page 4.) 
Prudential merely argues that the plaintiff's damages were 
"excluded by the contract when read as a whole." (Prudential's 
Brief in Opposition, page 4.) Prudential does not even attempt 
to explain how a paragraph providing "comprehensive coverage" for 
"a car" can mean anything, if the excluded mechanical unit is the 
entire "automobile", as stated by the Court of Appeals. 
(Memorandum Decision, page 3; Appendix I to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari.) 
Under the Court of Appeals' interpretation, the 
exclusion swallows the inclusion. The so-called "comprehensive 
coverage" paragraph is read entirely out of the policy and does 
not "cover" anything under any possible set of facts. Under the 
consistent decisions of this Court, the policy should have been 
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read so as to give some meaning to the coverage paragraph if 
possible. Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614 P.2d 160 
(Utah 1980); Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733 (Utah 1980)? Minshew 
v. Chevron Oil Company, 575 P.2d 192 (Utah 1978). 
3. Burden of Proof. 
Prudential also seems to concede that "the burden of 
proof is on the insurer to prove facts that would avoid liability 
because of a policy exclusion." (Prudential's Brief in 
Opposition, page 4.) Prudential merely argues, without citing 
authorities, that "Swenson had a mechanical problem with his car. 
[This is the question at issue.] His car was never stolen or 
involved in a collision of any sort. [These facts, though 
correct, are irrelevant to a definition of "mechanical 
breakdown".] Therefore, a simple reading of the policy was all 
that was required." (Prudential's Brief in Opposition, page 4.) 
To the contrary, as noted above, the District Court found that 
"the language [of the policy] is somewhat confusing". (Tr. 3? 
Appendix III to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.) 
Prudential also makes the astonishing statement that 
"the Court of Appeals based their [sic] decision on the facts 
that the respondent (... Prudential) put forth in meeting their 
[sic] burden of proof." Prudential does not state with 
specificity what "facts" it "put forth" or when, nor could it, 
since it was granted summary judgment without filinq so much as a 
supporting affidavit. 
To the extent, if any, that any portion of the original 
damages to plaintiff's automobile were "mechanical", the burden 
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of proof should have been placed on Prudential/ at trial/ to 
separate those from the damages as a whole. Whitlock v. Old 
American Insurance Company/ 21 Utah 2d 131/ 442 P.2d 26 (1968). 
Otherwise/ Prudential having apparently conceded the accuracy of 
the plaintiff's statement of the facts, the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals should have held for the plaintiff as a 
matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Prudential describes the plaintiff's interpretation of 
the subject policy as "ludicrous". However/ a necessary 
corollary to the Court of Appeals' interpretation is that the 
paragraph entitled "comprehensive coverage" in Prudential's self-
proclaimed "easy reading" policy covers nothing under any 
possible set of facts. The Court of Appeals has reached a result 
inconsistent with the decision of another panel of the Court of 
Appeals/ and contrary to firmly established principles of 
contract construction and proof as previously decided and 
reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court. This Court should bring an 
end to the growing confusion by defining the test to determine 
what is "mechanical breakdown" and what is not. 
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GORDON J. SWENSON 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
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